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Abstract
Incoming governments sometimes abuse their power to manipulate the allocation of govern-
ment contracts so as to buy loyalty from cronies. While scandals suggest such practices are
relatively widespread, the extent of such partisan favoritism is difficult to measure and the
conditions under which it flourishes under-theorized. Drawing on theory regarding the role of
institutions as constraints on corruption, we identify three spheres of political influence over
government contracting and show how elites can manipulate two of those spheres to increase
their opportunities to influence the procurement process and minimize external accountability,
facilitating the corrupt allocation of contracts to partisan allies. Using an innovative big data
methodology, we then identify the effects of a change in government on procurement markets
in two countries, Hungary and the United Kingdom, which differ in terms of political influence
over these institutions. We find that politically-favored companies secure 50–60% of the
central government contracting market in Hungary but only 10% in the UK.
Keywords Grand corruption . Public procurement . Clientelism . Governance . Corruption
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Introduction
An important form of grand corruption occurs when political elites allocate state resources in
exchange for political support, a practice traditionally known as clientelism (Hicken 2011).
Politicians distribute a variety of resources in this way (Piattoni 2001): they abuse their
patronage power to appoint allies to civil service positions (Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012);
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they design privatization programs so as to ensure that state assets are sold to cronies (Ganev
2005); and they manipulate the public procurement process to grant friends or relatives
preferential access to public contracts for goods, works, and services (Grodeland 2010;
Hamilton 2010). This last type of corrupt exchange, where politicians use their control over
individuals and institutions involved in the procurement process to steer contracts toward
favored companies, is our focus here.
Politicians are motivated to corrupt the procurement process partly to channel private gains
to themselves and their families but also because the strategic allocation of state resources buys
loyalty which in turn helps them to consolidate their power and gain an advantage over their
political competitors. This ‘loyalty’ also comes in many forms, including donations to political
parties or individual campaigns, direct bribes or ‘kickbacks’ on contracts, and sometimes in-
kind provision of services — as in Turkey, where media companies that benefit from
government contracts provide supportive coverage of the government in return (Emek and
Acar 2015). These relationships also benefit the companies, which secure a steady stream of
easy business and see their competitors kept out of the market (Faccio 2006; Fisman 2001;
Goldman et al. 2013). Therefore, such practices can quickly become systemic. Rather than
being ad hoc corrupt acts by individual politicians or businesses, the entire public procurement
process may be captured by a closely knit political-business elite, which becomes increasingly
interested in (ab)using its power to further protect the market.
Given that public procurement accounts for on average 29% of total general government
expenditure in OECD countries (2013 data) (OECD 2015), and closer to 50% of public
spending in developing countries, these practices can cause serious damage to the economy
and to public confidence in institutions. Favoritism in the allocation of public contracts can
lead to higher prices, reduced value for money, the provision of low-quality or unsafe works,
goods and services, and reduced competition (Bank 2016; Dastidar and Mukherjee 2014;
Hessami 2014). It is also likely to harm democracy since, by distributing resources according
to particularistic ties, partisan favoritism disadvantages parties that lack connections and thus
weakens political competition (Stark and Vedres 2012). Clientelism may even reverse the
conventional relationship of democratic accountability, with politicians holding supporters to
account for their behavior (Stokes 2005).
Some governments are more constrained than others in their ability to allocate contracts in a
partisan manner. Theories of corruption control explain this in terms of the balance of
opportunities and constraints in a country (Klitgaard 1991; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013, 2015).
The opportunities depend on factors such as how many resources the state has at its disposal,
with natural resources and development aid boosting the opportunities considerably (Fazekas
and King 2018; Tavares 2003). The constraints relate partly to international commitments but
very largely to domestic institutions — specifically, the extent to which a country’s ‘account-
ability ecosystem’ comprises capable and autonomous institutions, including civil society
organizations, able to scrutinize the exercise of power and hold misconduct to account (Bauhr
and Grimes 2014; Lindstedt and Naurin 2010; Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov 2017). Yet this
accountability ecosystem is not an exogenous factor. Rather, political elites in power also have
some scope — depending on the constitution and political culture— to influence and change
the institutions that are supposed to hold them to account, and may seek to do so in ways that
disable those constraints, further increasing their opportunities to engage in corruption.
We draw on two country case studies— the United Kingdom and Hungary— to illustrate
how political elites in certain institutional contexts can exploit and create opportunities to
manipulate government contracting, specifically for partisan (as well as private) gain. We then
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showcase a new method for measuring the extent to which public procurement markets are
captured. Both the UK and Hungary experienced a change of government in 2010, following
general elections that saw centre-left parties defeated and centre-right parties come to power.
They also experienced similar macroeconomic shocks, leading governments to respond with
stimulus packages and austerity programs. Both countries are members of the European
Union, and hence public procurement is conducted under ostensibly similar rules, as set out
in the EU Public Procurement Directive, at least for contracts above a threshold value.1
However, the accountability ecosystems of the two cases vary considerably. This is
illustrated by aggregate governance indicators: on the Index of Public Integrity
(https://integrity-index.org), the UK scores 9.10, while Hungary, scoring 7.43, is the fourth-
worst performer in the European Union (2017 figures). The divergence between the two is
even more pronounced in a few key areas. On judicial independence, the UK scores 9.29 while
Hungary’s score is only 4.24. On freedom of the press, another critical check on executive
power, the UK scores 8.20 and Hungary 6.51. For a more qualitative understanding of
institutional quality, we conducted interviews with key informants (14 in Hungary and 17 in
the UK), including procurement officials, companies that bid for public tenders, and profes-
sionals from audit institutions, civil society organizations and the media, to better understand
how these differences in institutional controls create opportunities to influence or capture the
procurement process.
The political parties in power at this time also differed in their capacity to control the
executive. In the United Kingdom, the new government was a coalition of Conservatives and
Liberal Democrats; the incoming government in Hungary comprised one party, Fidesz, with a
two-thirds majority in parliament, sufficient to change the constitution. In the UK, the
institutional framework limited political influence over central government procurement and
the new government did not seek, by and large, to disable the institutional checks and balances.
In Hungary, the institutional framework was already weaker, but the incoming government
also used its power to make extensive political appointments to key institutions and to
undertake a program of far-reaching constitutional reforms — which have been characterized
as ‘democratic backsliding’ (Greskovits 2015; Sedelmeier 2014). These steps expanded the
government’s opportunities to politically influence the allocation of state resources through
procurement while also making it easier to evade accountability, i.e., reducing constraints on
the exercise of power.
Having established that the two incoming governments differed in terms of their opportu-
nities to exert partisan influence over procurement, we use a new method to assess whether
they did in fact steer public contracts to partisan allies. We adopt a ‘follow the money’
approach that focuses on monitoring change in how resources are allocated among companies
following a change of government. We measure the proportion of contracts distributed to
partisan allies by analyzing shifts in procurement market outcomes that occur as a result of
government change. Controlling for changes in overall spending priorities, we isolate suspi-
cious changes in contracting success at the company level and cross-check these against the
prevalence of selected corruption risks — or ‘red flags’ — in procurement processes. Where
both conditions are present— i.e., a change in government affects procurement outcomes and
the beneficiary companies win under conditions associated with corruption red flags — we
argue that this is indicative of partisan favoritism.
1 The ‘classical’ directive 2014/24/EU on General Procurement and separate directives for concessions and
utilities govern all public procurement of contracts above certain value thresholds within EU member states.
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Analyzing a complete database of regulated central government purchases in the two
countries in 2009–12, containing 21,000 contract awards, we find that, in Hungary, around
50–60% of public procurement is awarded to companies that win under such conditions. In the
UK, where institutional controls are more robust, only around 10% of the market is associated
with partisan favoritism.
Capturing the procurement process
Theoretical framework
We propose a framework for assessing the extent to which public procurement may be subject
to capture by a political elite. We contend that politicians seeking to engage in partisan
favoritism aim to control three spheres of the procurement process: the formation of public
procurement law; the implementation of procurement by the bureaucracy; and the monitoring
of implementation, which includes audits, complaint mechanisms, and scrutiny by civil society
organizations and the media. It is not necessary to control all of these stages in order to steer
contracts to partisan allies, but control over more aspects will mean that partisan goals can be
achieved more efficiently and with less risk of challenge.
Elites seeking to control these different spheres have a range of techniques at their disposal
(see Table 1). At the stage of policy formation, for example, they may shape the procurement
law, e.g., by changing the thresholds at which contract awards must be published in official
journals (Emek and Acar 2015) or altering the conditions for permitting a negotiated (non-
competitive) tender, in an effort to increase the scope for conducting procurement beyond the
reaches of scrutiny. In the implementation phase (OECD 2009; Ware et al. 2007), corrupt elites
might seek to persuade public officials to falsely inflate needs (buying goods that are not
necessary), narrowly specify the tender criteria (so as to favor a certain bidder), make excessive
provision for errors (with a view to inflating costs later), or incorrectly apply criteria for
judging bids. Corrupt political influence in the third sphere may occur when politicians seek to
deliberately ‘disable’ institutions that are supposed to monitor and check the integrity of the
procurement process, such as the judiciary, supreme audit institutions, the media, and civil
society organizations.
Corruption at the formation stage is arguably the most pernicious. It creates a new policy or
legal framework which may unfairly benefit a captor group into the long term, but without
requiring them to break laws or violate rules each time they benefit. Corruption of policy
implementation, by contrast, occurs on a transaction by transaction basis, with each exchange
requiring a new violation that is potentially vulnerable to detection; arguably, corruption at this
stage does not enable one group to entrench its advantage to such an extent. The World Bank
refers to corruption during policy formation as state capture, and corruption in the implemen-
tation phase as ‘administrative corruption’ (World Bank 2000).
However, while capture of policy formation may be the most efficient channel, this is
curtailed in the EU context because much of the scope and nature of national laws on public
procurement is prescribed by the EU Public Procurement Directive.2 There is variation in how
the Directive is transposed into national law (Fazekas et al. 2015) but, by and large, national
2 The directive determines the types of procedure to be used for contracts of a certain value, sets out the number
of quotes that must be solicited, and ensures the competitive nature of the process in other ways.
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political elites in the EU have little discretion here and few opportunities for corruption. Their
best alternative for controlling procurement is to systematically influence the implementation
process. Politicians are better able to influence the implementation of procurement where they
have greater control over the bureaucrats charged with implementation, e.g., where the power
to hire and fire bureaucrats is in their gift (Charron et al. 2017). They also have greater control
where there is less bureaucratic autonomy, and where implementing institutions are less
dependent on actions initiated by other agencies (Anderson 1988; Gordon 2011; Piattoni
2001; Van de Walle 2007).
We argue that influence over the third sphere— monitoring institutions — is an important
way for elites to consolidate and protect corrupt gains. Accountability institutions are critical to
ensuring the integrity of public procurement (Knack et al. 2017; Lederman et al. 2005;
Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadašov 2017). This is because procurement is
complex, meaning that proper accountability requires thorough scrutiny by well-resourced and
independent oversight institutions, also because public officials, politicians, and companies
often become expert in gaming the system (Hudon and Garzón 2016).
Political influence over accountability institutions can be achieved in a number of ways.
Where the governing party has an overwhelming majority, it can enact constitutional reforms
to reduce the powers of such institutions, or simply increase its political control over their
Table 1 Techniques for political capture of public procurement
Sphere of influence Objective of corrupt elite Example techniques
Policy Formation
Drafting of Public Procurement Act
and secondary regulation
Ensure that law provides
opportunities for procurement to
occur with minimal scrutiny (e.g.,
high thresholds for transparency,
weak controls over use of
non-competitive procedures)
Use executive power to draft a
favorable bill
Use parliamentary majority to
secure passage of bill
Use control of parliamentary
timetable to assure swift passage




tender design, evaluation of bids,
contract award
Ensure that process favors certain
bidders, rather than being
competitive
Use patronage power to appoint
loyal officials to key roles
implementing procurement
process
Intervene in process to recommend
certain courses of action, e.g.,
appointing certain advisers,
including specific clauses in
contract
Threaten to fire individuals that do
not bow to pressure
Accountability
Audits, judicial review, scrutiny by
civil society groups and the
media
Disable checks and balances, so that
favoritism in procurement goes
undetected or unchallenged
Use constitutional reform to change
procedures for appointments to
these institutions
Appoint allies as heads of
institutions
Appoint individuals only as ‘acting’
heads, to increase their insecurity
(and loyalty)
Exert pressure over media by
withdrawing state advertising
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appointments, budgets, or mandates, thereby fostering loyalty or insecurity, and priming
channels for informal influence. This requires considerable investment of time, resources
and political capital, but the investment promises to pay off handsomely if perpetrators are
thus able to use public procurement to allocate state resources to partisan allies (and them-
selves) as long as they are in power.
In the next two sections, we briefly review qualitative evidence about the scope for partisan
influence over procurement in our two case-study countries, focusing on the spheres of
implementation and accountability (since policy formation is constrained by the EUDirective).
Institutional controls in Hungary
In Hungary, conditions are ripe for political influence over policy implementation. The
boundary between the public and private sectors is blurred (Ganev 2005; Wedel 2003), the
public administration is characterized by extensive party patronage with deep and far-reaching
changes in personnel when the government changes (Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012), and
business organizations tend to align with political factions (Jancsics and Jávor 2012; Stark and
Vedres 2012). Procuring entities in Hungary are incentivized to comply with political instruc-
tions because their budgets are controlled by the central government. Our interviews with
procurement officers revealed that political patronage is sometimes accompanied by direct
political intervention in the implementation of procurement procedures. One interview respon-
dent explained:
The head of my agency got the instruction from the ministry (political leadership, not
professional) on whom exactly the procurement advisor of the agency should be. We
quickly realized that this advisor is a man from politics— his selection was not based on
professional standards, but political considerations. In fact, my agency had no autonomy
in selecting the procurement advisor. Then this advisor crafted the tender specs to fit one
company without us realizing it. We only realized what has happened when the contract
was awarded.
In other cases, spurious grounds are used to rule out competition altogether. Non-competitive
procedures — allowed on grounds of national security — are invoked with suspicious
frequency (Fazekas et al. 2016).
Political connections have also been evident in scandals. The EU counter-fraud agency,
OLAF, opened an investigation into the procurement of street lighting by municipalities after
investigative journalists reported that a newly founded company, Elios, owned by the son-in-
law of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, had won 19 tenders in a short period and been the sole
bidder on at least eight occasions, despite there being 10–12 experienced suppliers.3 In tenders
where Elios was successful, the needs had often been specified very narrowly. Sometimes
three companies had submitted bids, but all written by employees of Elios (OCCRP, 27 August
2018) and the lamps were as much as 56% more expensive than usual (The Guardian, 12
February 2018).
Further evidence of the importance of political connections emerges from the record of
companies owned by individuals close to the ruling elite. Major construction company
3 http://www.direkt36.hu/en/2015/03/11/tiborcz-istvan-es-az-elios-innovativ-zrt-sikerei-ledes-kozvilagitasi-
kozbeszerzeseken/
E. Dávid-Barrett, M. Fazekas
Közgép, owned by Lajos Simicska, a high-school room-mate and long-time ally of Prime
Minister Viktor Orbán, quickly became the largest recipient of government contracts after the
2010 change of government. However, after a public personal conflict between Simicska and
Orbán in autumn 2014, Közgép’s success on procurement markets plummeted (see Fig. 1).
Following the dispute, many irregularities were suddenly found in contracts won by
Simicska’s companies, leading to contract cancellations and a three-year debarment.4
The Fidesz government has used its extensive executive power to systematically weaken
the accountability sphere. It has reduced the autonomy of the constitutional court and judiciary
by politicizing appointments and introducing measures to reduce the power and independence
of judges, moves which have been characterized as Bdisabling^ the checks on government
power (Bánkuti et al. 2012). The president of the newly created National Judicial Office has
the power to select, promote and demote judges, begin disciplinary proceedings, and to select
the leaders of every court. The person chosen to fill this office was a close friend of Orbán and
the wife of a Fidesz MEP who was the principal drafter of the new constitution. Bánkuti et al.
(2012) note that the president of the National Judicial Office’s used her power to reassign
specific cases to different courts, in February 2012, to move a high-profile corruption case
against officials of the former government as well as an appeal by a Fidesz party member from
a criminal conviction for corruption.
The individual appointed to head the Hungarian State Audit Office, meanwhile, to hold the
post for 12 years, was also a former Fidesz Member of Parliament, and had no prior
professional auditing experience. The government also appointed loyalists to the Constitution-
al Court, Budget Council, Competition Authority, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the
National Bank. These moves considerably weakened the independence of these monitoring
institutions and, arguably, their ability to hold the government to account.
Fig. 1 Total value of contracts held by Közgép Plc, Hungary, 2002–15
4 See Budapest Business Journal, 20 July 2015, http://bbj.hu/business/report-kozgep-banned-from-public-
procurement-tenders_101146; Budapest Business Journal, 22 December 2015, http://bbj.hu/economy/simicska-
loses-right-to-operate-poster-kiosks-in-capital_109173; and Reuters, 31 March 2015, http://www.reuters.
com/article/hungary-probe-idUSL6N0WX3KC2015033.
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Institutional controls in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the capacity of political elites to control the implementation phase
through patronage is much weaker. Appointments to the civil service are meritocratic and
mainly non-political (Heywood 2012), with the exception of special advisers (Yong and Hazell
2014). There is little change in personnel when governments change, and our interviews
suggested that the institutional structures for implementing and monitoring public procurement
are much less prone to political influence. Nor did our research reveal evidence of political
favoritism in practice.
The market for outsourced public services is, however, dominated by very few firms — in
the period studied, these were G4S, Capita, Serco, Carillion, Babcock, and Mitie. This means
that, especially for some contracts, the level of competition may be severely limited. This
raises questions as to whether the efficiency benefits that were the rationale for such extensive
outsourcing are being achieved. Questions about the government’s ability to hold these
companies to account intensified following the bankruptcy of Carillion in early 2018. There
is also some evidence that the post-award contract implementation stage of the procurement
process is less well controlled than earlier phases (Fazekas and Dávid-Barrett 2015). This stage
is often managed by the department that uses the procured works, goods or services, rather
than by the more technically expert central procurement function, leading to reduced scrutiny.
However, a greater concern for our respondents was that individual bureaucrats responsible
for procurement might favor companies because of future career considerations. The media
frequently reports alleged conflicts of interest relating to the ‘revolving door’, whereby public
officials leave office to take jobs in private-sector firms that bid for government contracts.
Empirical research in the United States has found that firms that hire through the revolving
door are indeed more successful in winning government contracts (Canayaz et al. 2014).
Moreover, the regulatory body responsible for advising on business appointments in the UK
has no statutory authority and is rather passive (David-Barrett 2011).
Yet overall, the period studied was one of increasing transparency and openness within a
stable institutional framework. There is no evidence of systemic efforts to subvert controls and
exercise political influence.
Measuring partisan favoritism
Around the world, a growing commitment to transparency among governments has often
resulted in ‘big data’ on public procurement becoming available at the level of contracts, while
advances in computing capacity have made it easier to collect and analyze such data. We take
advantage of these developments to design a method for testing our hypothesis — about the
impact of government change on the award of contracts in different institutional conditions—
by analyzing administrative data on government contracts for indicators of political influence
on bidder success. First, we monitor whether, for a given company, the value of contracts won
is influenced by a change in government. Second, for those companies that we identify as
potential beneficiaries of favoritism, we analyze ‘red flags’ in the tendering process to gain a
deeper understanding of the conditions under which they win contracts, that is whether the
implementation process could be corrupted. By cross-checking these two indicators, we
construct a more sophisticated indicator of partisan favoritism and aim to exclude cases that
exhibit favoritism-type patterns for alternative, non-corrupt reasons.
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Controlling for changes in policy priorities, we would not expect a significant change in
outcomes as a result of a change in government. In a market characterized by partisan
favoritism, however, we expect past performance to become a liability, i.e., company X which
is linked to the previous government will no longer be favored following a change in
government (and may even be discriminated against). Thus, for a given company, changes
in the value of contracts won following a change in government are a proxy for favoritism.
The quantitative analysis rests on the expectation that the logic of a favoritism-free open market
describes the observed market success (i.e., value of contracts won per quarter) of some companies
but not others. In particular, there may be some companies which performwell under government 1,
but poorly under government 2 (‘surprise losers’). Conversely, there could be companies which win
a negligible value of contracts under government 1, but secure large amounts under government 2
(‘surprise winners’). The analysis focuses on the value of contracts won while controlling for the
overall structure of government spending as well as firm characteristics. Contract value is the
outcomewe seek to explain as it represents the primary source of rent extractionwith larger contracts
allowing for higher rents. Using regression analysis, we can denote ‘surprise losers’ and ‘surprise
winners’ as companies having ties to government 1 and 2 respectively; the indirect regression
evidence suggests that they benefit from political change even after controlling for key alternative
economic explanations.5
The following generic dynamic panel regression models are estimated throughout the
whole observation period:
CVti ¼ C þ B1*CVt−1i þ B2*CVt−2i þ B4*CVMti þ B5*MMi þ Ui þWit ð1Þ
where C denotes the constant term for the whole sample; CVti denotes the contract value won
by company i in quarter t; CVt-1i, and CVt-2i, denote the contract value won by company i in
past periods t-1 and t-2 respectively; CVMti indicates the contract value spent in the main
market of company i in quarter t; MMi contains the sectoral dummy for the main market for
firm i; Ui is the fixed effect component of company i; andWit is the error term for company i in
quarter t. We use the Arellano-Bond system GMM transformation of the above equation which
is a widely used solution to the estimation biases from using past values of the dependent
variable as predictor providing unbiased estimation of model parameters (Roodman 2009).
Because contract values have a very skewed distribution with most companies winning
relatively little and very few companies winning large amounts, we had to transform them to
achieve an approximate normal distribution of the dependent variable. We opted for two
versions: using the fourth root6 and the natural log contract values. The downside of using log
as opposed to fourth root contract values is that the companies without any contract in a given
quarter show up as missing, decreasing the sample size considerably. Regressions are fitted on
a subsample of companies that win contracts in at least two different quarters in order to focus
the analysis on companies that benefit substantially from government contracts, even though
most companies win only in one quarter.7 Equation (1) contains all the predictors with
considerable predictive power.
5 While companies may act collectively in systematically corrupt environments, as long as on average one group
benefits from government change while another loses out, our methodology is robust to identify market-level
favoritism because distributional effects within loser and winner groups cancel out on average.
6 The more widely used square root transformation did not lead to sufficiently normally distributed dependent
variable, and hence the fourth root transformation was applied.
7 Results of alternative regression specifications containing company financial information and geographical
location are available upon request.
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The two versions Eq. (1) can take, i.e., the dependent variable being the 4th root contract
value or the log contract value, enable us to identify two different types of companies
benefiting from government favoritism. In the first case, companies that have previously
won no contracts at all, and sometimes have had no significant prior business activity at all,
enter the government contracting market and win large sums immediately. This may indicate
that companies have been set up by government cronies who have received advance warning
of upcoming opportunities, often specifically tailored to their companies (as in the case of
Elios mentioned in "Capturing the procurement process"). The situation is captured by the 4th
root contract value version of the regression as it keeps the company-quarter observations with
zero contract value in the sample. In the second case, established companies greatly extend
their contract volume using their connections to those coming into office (as in the case of
Közgép mentioned in "Capturing the procurement process"). This situation is best captured by
the log contract value version of the regression as it removes brand new companies that enter
the procurement market and estimates the model using only those companies which have a
more established track record.
Technically, ‘surprise losers’ and ‘surprise winners’ are identified using company-specific
error terms after estimating Eq. (1). ‘Surprise losers’ are those which have an above period-
average regression error under government 1 and below period-average regression error under
government 2. Their error term pattern indicates that they win more than predicted under
government 1, but less than predicted under government 2. ‘Surprise winners’ are identified by
exactly the opposite error term profile. Companies without such an error term pattern are
simply denoted as ‘stable companies’, which means that their market success is not affected by
which party is in power. This matching between regression error terms and company catego-
ries represents the closest alignment between theory and empirics.
Note that stable market success does not necessarily indicate a lack of favoritism per se.
Grand corruption tends to take different forms depending on the political and social structure
of a country, characterized by Michael Johnston as different Bsyndromes^ of political corrup-
tion (Johnston 2005). In some contexts, private-sector actors seek to corrupt multiple political
parties, rather than having partisan links to just one party. In others, companies strategically
build strong ties with both incumbent and opposition parties, so that they benefit whoever is in
power; or create links to stable parts of the government (such as the permanent bureaucracy) to
insulate themselves from the shock of a shift in power within a corrupt elite. This paper focuses
on collaboration between political and business elites united by a shared partisan identity,
where grand corruption based on procurement is characterized more by an ‘our turn to eat’
approach, with an incoming government abusing their office to reward their ‘own’ side, at the
expense of allies of their predecessor (Burgess et al. 2011).
The main shortcoming of the indirect identification of favored companies is that highly
innovative and competitive market entrants might also appear as favored companies (i.e.,
‘surprise winners’) since they also deviate from the standard predicted behavior. Similarly,
while we control for overall spending patterns in the regressions, more fine-grained aspects of
changing government spending structure — e.g., a switch to procuring green energy over
fossil-fuel-based energy — cannot be taken into account.
In order to check for alternative explanations not involving corruption, the corruption risks of
surprise winners and losers are cross-checked using a Corruption Risk Index (CRI) established by
prior research (Charron et al. 2017; Fazekas and Kocsis 2017). The index builds on work by other
scholars using red flags as proxy measures for corruption (Auriol et al. 2011; Klasnja 2016). A key
indicator of corruption risks is the presence of single-bidder contracts awarded on otherwise
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competitive markets, which may indicate that market access has been deliberately restricted.8 In
addition to single bidding, several process-related indicators of corruption risks are used relating to
the ways in which the implementation of the process can bemanipulated, such as an unusually short
deadline for submitting bids or convoluted tender specifications suggesting that they are tailored to a
particular company. Further details of indicator building and validity tests are provided in the
Supplementary Material.
The CRI is constructed to incorporate the average incidence of single bids received and five
process-related ‘red flags’. The CRI varies between 0 and 1, where 0 =minimum corruption risk and
1 =maximum corruption risk. Such a composite score allows for tracking changes in corruption
risks across a country over time or by geographical area, and crucially also for identifying individual
government suppliers with the highest risk performance within a country. While governments
changed in both the UK and Hungary in 2010, conveniently for our measurement framework, the
overall level of corruption risks remained largely stable over time within each country, with the UK
having generally lower risks than Hungary (Fig. 2).
If both of our indicators point in the same direction for a given company, i.e., the company’s
pattern of winning contracts changes after a change of government and the conditions in which it
wins tenders are associated with numerous red flags, we suggest that this is indicative of a company
benefitting from partisan favoritism. We expect ‘surprise losers’ to win in the presence of more red
flags under government 1 than the rest of the procurement market, while winning in the presence of
similar or even lower prevalence of red flags under government 2 (an indication of falling out of
grace with the power holders). Our expectations are exactly the opposite for ‘surprise winners’. In
countries where favoritism is systemic, such patterns would be discernible on the level of company
groups; if favoritismwere the exception to the norm, only a small number of exceptional companies
would display both market success and CRI patterns in line with our expectations.9
Data
For the quantitative analysis, we use newly collected micro-level public procurement data from
the UK and Hungarian governments. Our database derives from official public procurement
announcements in 2009–12, which appear in Tenders Electronic Daily (TED), an online
supplement to the Official Journal of the EU dedicated to public procurement (DG
GROWTH 2015). Both countries’ public procurement legislation is within the framework of
the EU Public Procurement Directives, and hence national data are directly comparable
(European Commission 2014). The data represent a complete database of all public procure-
ment procedures conducted under the EU Public Procurement Directive by these two EU
member states regardless of the funding source (i.e., both national and EU-funded procure-
ment).10 The EU Directives regulate purchases by every public body and state-owned
8 The quantitative corruption risk methodology is only applied to competitive markets, where a lack of
competition is likely to be the result of the tendering process characteristics rather than technology or the
underlying market structure. This is not to say that on the other markets there is no corruption, rather, those
markets are better approached with qualitative than quantitative methods.
9 Please note that our expectation is complex, first we expect a company’s winning pattern fit a favoritist
trajectory (categorical risk) while also having higher than average CRI (continuous risk).
10 The database was released by the European Commission - DG GROWTH, which also conducted some data
quality checks and enhancements. Source data can be downloaded from: https://open-data.europa.
eu/en/data/dataset/ted-csv
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enterprises in every economic sector ranging from construction to legal services (some
exceptions apply to defence and specialized legal services) (Charron et al. 2017). TED
contains calls for tenders and contract award notices, and enables us to analyze variables,
such as contract value, name of winning bidder, number of bids submitted, deadline for
submitting bids, and assessment criteria. As company unique identifiers are not mandatory
to report in TED, we automatically as well as manually matched company names and
addresses to company registry database obtained from Bureau van Dijk, a commercial
company data provider.
The analyzed database contains a subset of all the contracts publicly announced in these
two countries (Table 2). We exclude contracts for the following reasons: (i) contracts awarded
by public bodies other than the national central administration; (ii) contracts below mandatory
reporting thresholds11; and (iii) contracts on non-competitive markets. First, we focus on
central governments because a single change of central government is more tractable and
comparable across countries than the multitude of local elections, and because we expect high-
level political favoritism — and the power necessary to corrupt the formation of procurement
policy and the disabling of institutions — to be driven by national politics. Second, we omit
contracts below mandatory reporting thresholds because the EU Public Procurement Directive
only regulates contracts above these thresholds, e.g., for services, contracts awarded by central
government bodies with value above €134,000 in 2015. Contracts below such thresholds are
not directly comparable across countries because national regulations are somewhat different
and may be shaped by national favoritist politics. Importantly, below-threshold nationally
regulated public procurement tenders must still be advertised and follow tightly defined
procedural rules.12 Nevertheless, some gaming around reporting thresholds is likely, but
evidence from other countries (Bobilev et al. 2015; Coviello and Mariniello 2014; Tóth and
Fazekas 2017) suggests it is likely to be limited. Thus, our data are a near-complete, unbiased
sample of total procurement activities in the two countries for high-value procurement tenders,
which are of utmost importance for partisan favoritism. Third, we restrict the sample to
competitive markets (i.e., markets defined by product group and region with more than nine
11 http://www.ojec.com/threshholds.aspx
12 For a full mapping of national procurement regulations, below EU thresholds see: http://europam.eu/
Fig. 2 Average Corruption Risk Index (CRI) per half-years in the UK and Hungary, n = 4403
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contracts in the observation period) as on these markets meaningful competition is expected
under non-corrupt conditions, enabling us to better identify deviations from competition that
might be driven by non-economic considerations. The full dataset is downloadable at
digiwhist.eu/resources/data.
The database covers the 2009–12 period for both countries in order to allow for around
1.5 years before and after the elections (May 2010). Company-level analysis was done on a
half-yearly aggregated database obtained by aggregating the contract-level data using names of
winning company and the dates of contract awards. Using half-years as time periods is optimal
for retaining a high level of granularity while also taking into account the erratic character of
many public procurement markets (i.e., low numbers of larger contracts awarded every few
months). To define governments in each of the countries, we used the official date of national
elections. Since tendering can last for several months especially in complex and high-value
cases, we allowed for a one year-long transitory period in order to capture the differences
between two distinct established governments in each country (2010H2-2011H1).
Results
Our quantitative analysis of contracting data reveals strong evidence of partisan favoritism in
Hungarian central government procurement around the 2010 change of government. Regres-
sions describing company market success (i.e., value of contracts won per quarter) point to a
low-to-moderate degree of persistence of company performance throughout the whole period
(Table 3). Those company groups that follow a suspicious market success pattern (‘surprise
winners’ and ‘surprise losers’) are associated with the CRI patterns indicative of favoritism in
procurement tenders (Fig. 3). These companies dominate the Hungarian public procurement
market, controlling 50–60% of the total contract value awarded.
Using the system GMM estimator of the dynamic panel data model specified in Eq. (1), we
find weak-to-moderately-strong evidence of persistent company performance throughout
2009–12 (Table 3).13 For example, in model 2, a 1 unit increase in the log contract value
won in the past quarter results in a 0.2 unit increase in the following quarter. Such weak path
dependence is particularly disrupted by the 2010 change of government, which suggests
political influence on a purchasing function otherwise driven by economic considerations.
Model 1 has high explanatory power14: 0.92, while Model 2 has only 0.03. As Model 2 is
designed to capture the persistent performance of the most established companies, the lack of







Share of national total
procurement value
Hungary 5549 2462 5 50%
UK 15,429 7610 243 68%
Total 20,978 10,072 248 67%
13 Tests of the adequacy of the instruments used to tackle the endogeneity problem between the lagged dependent
and dependent variables (Sargan and Hansen tests) show that instrumental variables could to a large extent
correct for endogeneity.
14 In the absence of traditional R-squared statistics for system GMM models, we used the linear correlation
coefficient between predicted and observed outcomes.
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strong explanatory power is particular telling. Importantly, none of the regression models is
driven by dynamics in a single market, rather, each of them represents a balanced average
result across all major markets (the largest market’s share in the sample is 6.5%).
The two regressions15 in Table 3 enable us to identify many firms with suspicious winning
patterns: ‘surprise losers’ and ‘surprise winners’ represent 153 and 225 of the total 573
companies, respectively. Recall, companies are denoted as ‘surprise losers’ when they have
an above period-average regression error under government 1 and below period-average
regression error under government 2. The opposite pattern is used to identify ‘surprise
winners’ (for a visual representation of group identification see Appendix, Figs. A1 and
A2). These company groups follow a CRI pattern consistent with favoritism (Fig. 3). ‘Surprise
losers’ have a higher CRI than stable or surprise winner companies under government 1; and
‘surprise winners’ win in the presence of more red flags than the rest of the market under
government 2.16 The difference in group CRI averages is particularly pronounced under the
second government. Overall, the evidence suggests that Hungarian central government pro-
curement is characterized by systematic partisan favoritism. The favored companies, surprise
winners and losers combined, control about 50–60% of the total central government
contracting market 2009–12, with a distinct swing in company fortunes around the change
of government in 2010, underlining the systemic nature of corruption in Hungary.
In the UK, by contrast, we find little evidence of systemic partisan favoritism in UK central
government contracting around the 2010 change of government. Regressions describing
company market success (i.e., value of contracts won per quarter) indicate highly consistent
company performance throughout both governments (Table 4). Those company groups with a
suspicious market success pattern are not associated with favoritist CRI patterns (Fig. 4). The
few companies that simultaneously have suspicious winning patterns and CRI trajectories
15 It was sufficient to display suspicious error term patterns in one of the regressions to be denoted as a suspicious
firm.
16 The difference in group means per period is significant in period 1 at 10% level and in period 2 at the 5% level.
Table 3 System GMM linear dynamic panel regression estimations explaining company market success,
Hungary, 2009–12
Dependent variable Fourth root of contract value Log contract value
Model number 1 2
Independent variables
Fourth root of contract value:1st lag 0.035***
Fourth root of contract value: 2nd lag 0.011*
log contract value: 1st lag 0.231***
Control variables
Year Y Y
Fourth root of contract value awarded on main market Y N
Log spending on main market N Y
Main product group (2-digit CPV) Y Y
N (company) 573 338
N (obs) 3438 582
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Estimations performed using Stata 14.2, fitting a standard Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator, with
1 or 2 lagged dependent variables. It uses the default variance-covariance matrix and the two-step standard error
correction algorithm. For full description see (Roodman 2009)
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control only about 10% of the market. This is in line with the qualitative findings— it suggests
isolated cases of corruption in public procurement, rather than systemic partisan favoritism.
Using a system GMM estimator of the dynamic panel data model specified in Eq. (1), we
find strong evidence for persistent company performance throughout 2009–12 (Table 4).17 For
example, in model 2, a 1 unit increase in the past quarter’s log contract value won results in an
almost equal amount of increase in the following quarter. Such strong path dependence
captures the consistency of company success in the UK from government to government.
Both regression models have high explanatory power18: 0.85 and 0.35 respectively; and none
of them is driven by dynamics in a single market, rather, they represent a balanced average
result across all major markets (the largest market’s share in the sample is 2.4%).
These regressions19 allow for the identification of a considerable number of firms with
suspicious winning patterns; ‘surprise losers’ and ‘surprise winners’ account for 379 and 343
out of 1294 companies, respectively. Once again, companies are denoted as ‘surprise losers’ or
‘surprise winners’ using their regression error compared to the period-average regression error
under different governments (for a visual representation of group identification see Appendix,
Figs. A3 and A4). However, the identified company groups follow a different CRI pattern than
a favoritism-driven dynamics would predict (Fig. 4). While ‘surprise losers’ have a higher CRI
than stable or surprise winner companies under government 1, there is no evidence of ‘turning
tides’ — i.e., ‘surprise winners’ winning in the presence of more red flags than the rest of the
Fig. 3 Percentage deviation in CRI scores of surprise winners and losers compared to stable companies, by
government period, Hungary, 2009–12 (Note: the differences between surprise winner and loser group means are
significant at 5% level for the before and after government change periods)
17 Tests of the adequacy of the instruments used to tackle the endogeneity problem between the lagged dependent
and dependent variables (Sargan and Hansen tests) show that instrumental variables could not fully correct for
endogeneity at least partially due to the strong persistence in the time series.
18 In the absence of traditional R-squared statistics for system GMM models, we used the linear correlation
coefficient between predicted and observed outcomes.
19 To be denoted as a suspicious firm, it is sufficient to display a suspicious error term pattern in one of the
regressions.
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market under government 2. While we cannot rule out the possibility that it takes longer than
18 months for an incoming government to establish its grip on government contracting and
effectively favor its connected firms in the UK, overall there is little evidence of systematic
partisan favoritism in UK central government procurement.
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some companies that have suspicious winning
patterns as well as CRI scores that deviate from their respective group averages. Such
companies are quite rare, representing deviant cases from an otherwise partisan favoritism-
free environment, with their combined market share fluctuating around 10% throughout 2009–
12.
Table 4 System GMM linear dynamic panel regression results explaining company market success, UK, 2009–
12
Dependent variable Fourth root of contract value Log contract value
Model number 1 2
Independent variables
Fourth root of contract value:1st lag 0.016*
Fourth root of contract value: 2nd lag 0.015*
Log contract value: 1st lag 0.949***
Control variables
Year Y Y
Fourth root of contract value awarded on main market Y N
Main product group (2-digit CPV) Y Y
N (company) 1293 682
N (obs) 7758 1203
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Estimations performed using Stata 14.2, fitting a standard Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator, with
1 or 2 lagged dependent variables. It uses the default variance-covariance matrix and the two-step standard error
correction algorithm. For full description see (Roodman 2009)
Fig. 4 Percentage deviation in CRI scores of surprise winners and losers compared to stable companies, by
government period, UK, 2009–12 (The differences in group means of surprise losers and winners are significant
only at the 10% level)
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Discussion and conclusions
This article examines how political elites use influence over the public procurement process to
allocate government contracts to partisan allies. We elaborate on the institutional conditions
that enable politicians to influence different aspects of the procurement environment so as to
best achieve partisan and favoritist aims. We identify three phases where political influence can
be effected: by shaping the formation of procurement laws; through patronage power and
direct influence over bureaucrats administering the implementation of procurement; and by the
use of appointments and constitutional changes to disable the institutional controls — or
checks and balances— that are supposed to hold political and bureaucratic power to account.
By analyzing the institutional framework and conducting interviews with public and private-
sector stakeholders, we arrive at a richer understanding of the opportunities and constraints on
partisan favoritism in two stages of public administration — the implementation of tender
processes and the checks provided by the accountability ecosystem — and in two country
cases.
In Hungary, extensive politicization of the bureaucracy and deliberate efforts to reduce the
autonomy of monitoring institutions make procurement highly vulnerable to partisan favorit-
ism. This is borne out by our quantitative analysis: we find that around 50–60% of the market
is controlled by companies that win despite a lack of prior success and exhibit high corruption
risks in their tenders. The ‘surprise winner’ companies often have personal connections to the
political elites, and some of them are entirely new companies with no prior relevant experi-
ence, yet quickly capture major shares of public procurement markets. In Hungary, favoritism
appears to be the rule of the game, unconstrained by the extensive EU legislative framework,
which is insufficiently equipped to control policy implementation and monitoring (Fazekas
and King 2018).
In the UK, the bureaucracy is considerably more autonomous and the institutional moni-
toring environment fairly sound. Nevertheless, companies that win despite a lack of prior
success and exhibit high corruption risks during tendering control around 10% of the market.
While much lower than in Hungary, the fact that some companies benefit from the change in
government and from competing in conditions that are associated with higher corruption risk
suggests that UK government contracting is not fully open and impartial. However, our
qualitative research did not find evidence of systemic political influence. Rather, these
outcomes might reflect isolated instances of opportunism, or result from the oligopolistic
structure that has emerged in some markets for government contracts.
Our methodology provides a way of analyzing rich contract-level public procurement data
to reliably identify systemic forms of partisan favoritism in government contracting. This
allows corruption researchers to break away from their traditional reliance on perceptions
indices and expert surveys and introduces objective proxy measures of types and patterns of
political corruption in a major area of public spending. It can be used to analyze other countries
with comparable public procurement datasets as well as sub-national data, to enhance our
understanding of this form of clientelism and to further test theories about the conditions in
which such grand corruption flourishes.
Our results are relevant to debates about the role of the EU in promoting good governance
and curbing corruption. They suggest that, even in the context of standardized EU regulation,
the public procurement process can be systematically manipulated by political elites that
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remain able and willing to maximize their political control over implementing authorities and
monitoring institutions. In the case of Hungary, such conduct has prompted relatively little
criticism from the European Commission, despite the fact that it undermines both the rule of
law and the single market. If the EU is to strengthen the functioning of the single market in
government contracts, it cannot rely as heavily on the integrity of domestic implementation as
it currently does.
More broadly, our results point to the importance of a robust institutional ecosystem in
which the autonomy of the bureaucracy and accountability institutions is secured by merito-
cratic appointments and an extensive web of checks and balances running throughout the three
spheres of procurement’s regulatory context. This means that success in constraining partisan
favoritism is, in keeping with recent theory on anti-corruption reforms, likely to require a
comprehensive, ‘Big Bang’ approach (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015; Rothstein 2011) rather than one-
off technical tweaks. Namely, institutional controls that apply to only one sphere are likely to
be inadequate to ensure the integrity of government contracting, as long as political elites can
respond by increasing their control over other spheres.
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